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 Abstract 
Human rights abuses occur regularly around the world, affecting millions of people each 
year. In the post-World War II era, a human rights movement helped create regional and 
international human rights regimes. This thesis tries to assess the impact of international 
human rights pressure on state compliance with international human rights norms and 
conventions. In investigating the impact of human rights pressure on states, I hypothesize 
that certain conditions are helpful. The first condition is the absence of a strong public 
opinion and/or cultural sentiment against what the pressuring entities are trying to 
achieve. The second condition is dependency: dependent countries are more vulnerable to 
economic and military threats, and thus are more likely to comply with international 
pressures. To support this hypothesis, I analyze human rights situations in one dependent 
country, the Dominican Republic; and a rising power, China. This thesis concludes that 
indeed, a strong public opinion and/or cultural sentiment militate against what the 
pressuring entities are trying to achieve. Thus, international human rights campaigns need 
domestic support as Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’ s seminal book Activists 
Beyond Borders notes. Contrary to my assumption that small dependent states are more 
susceptible to international human rights pressure, dependency did not play a significant 
role in the case studied. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Human rights abuses occur regularly around the world, affecting millions of 
people each year. In the post- World War II era, a human rights movement helped create 
regional and international human rights regimes. Non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) formed part of a network of organizations working together on behalf of human 
rights. The work of NGOs has made states’ repressive practices more visible and salient, 
forcing states to respond and improve practices. There are numerous cases of successful 
human rights advocacy around the world, such as the abolition of slavery, the case of the 
disappeared in Argentina in the 1970s, and the campaign against foot binding in China. 
But not every story is a story of success; at times the efforts of human rights pressure 
groups have not resulted in an improved human rights situation. Take for example the use 
of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war of 2013 and the continued practice of female 
genital mutilation throughout Africa. In the latter case there has been improvement, but 
much remains to be done. With millions of dollars invested annually to advocate for 
human rights it is useful to know how much change this advocacy has produced. How 
can we assess if human rights pressure is effective? And if so, can we determine what 
factors contribute to its success or failure? Why do human rights violations persist despite 
ongoing pressures for compliance with conventions and norms?  
My aim in researching this topic is to understand the dynamics of international 
human rights influence. If we can determine when and to what degree international 
human rights pressure has an influence on what states do we will be better equipped to 
formulate policy recommendations that can target the situations on the ground. Knowing 
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what conditions hinder the success of a human rights campaign would give the 
international community a valuable tool to better use its economic resources and man 
power, to create smarter campaigns and ways in which it can negotiate with government 
officials and other factions to effect the desired change in human rights. The study of the 
impact of international human rights pressure will help us explain not only positive 
changes in state behavior but also the persistence of norm violations.  
In sum, what is the impact of international pressure on state compliance? Which 
domestic factors mediate this influence? If international human rights pressure is 
effective, why does noncompliance remain widespread? Alternatively, if international 
pressure is ineffective, why have a growing number of transnational actors increased 
dramatically their pressure on noncompliant states? Understanding the complex ways in 
which states respond to human rights pressure could solve part of this puzzle. The subject 
has implications for what we know about the prospects for human rights reform, the 
impact of international norms, and, more broadly still, the nature of state sovereignty. If 
states respond in complex and often contradictory ways to international human rights 
pressure, how can those applying such pressures hope to enhance their influence? The 
conventional answer has been to increase human rights pressure, including by 
strengthening domestic proponents of international norms. How we think about 
compliance and the impact of international pressure is essential for devising more 
effective human rights policies. 
Although the rising consensus on global standards has yet to render the 
enforcement of human rights any easier, no one denies the growing importance of human 
rights to an emerging international order. 
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Chapter 2 
Research Design 
In investigating the impact of human rights pressure on states, I hypothesize that 
certain conditions are helpful. The first condition is the absence of a strong public 
opinion and/or cultural sentiment against what the pressuring entities are trying to 
achieve. The second condition is dependency: dependent countries are more vulnerable to 
economic and military threats, and thus are more likely to comply with international 
pressures. My first assumption is based on previous research by Keck and Sikkink that 
argues that international pressure is likely to succeed when members of a domestic 
society support international norms and join transnational networks of activists.1 
According to Keck and Sikkink, human rights reform occurs when international and 
domestic norms converge; therefore compliance is as much the result of pressures from 
“below” as from “above.” If a strong civil society and participation in international 
human rights networks create the conditions for reform, then public opinion against 
human rights could hinder the success of human rights pressure groups.  
The second assumption is based on the literature on dependency. The ability of a 
powerful nation to influence the foreign policy behavior of a weaker nation has long been 
recognized. According to Bruce Moon, dependent relationships occur between countries 
when a powerful state influences the foreign policy choices of a weak state, and the two 
countries engage in bargaining that is severely limited. Furthermore, he argues that such a 
dependency relationship “creates distortions in the social and political system of the 
weaker states which brings to power an elite whose interests, values and perceptions have 
                                                
1 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 15. 
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more in common with the elites of the powerful nation than with the masses in their own 
country.”2 Therefore I ask, under which conditions will a weak state not give in to the 
influence of a powerful state? How can we explain noncompliance from weak states? 
To answer these questions I will be using two countries as case studies: the 
Dominican Republic and China. The Dominican Republic and China were chosen for this 
analysis because they are premier examples of countries that have been under great 
international pressure to reform their human rights practices. These countries also provide 
an important contrast given that the Dominican Republic is a small dependent state and 
China is a rising power. Small states are usually more vulnerable to international 
pressures, therefore contrasting the events in the Dominican Republic to those in China 
will allow me to compare the different dynamics that are at play when a small state is 
targeted versus a big power. This is the second part of my hypothesis. 
I will begin by discussing the existing literature on the impact of human rights 
pressure, including previous research on compliance with international norms. I will then 
examine the domestic factors that affect compliance in my case studies, focusing on 
domestic public opinion, culture and economic dependence.  
Definitions  
 In order to address the effectiveness of human rights pressure it is important to 
first define how the term human rights will be employed throughout this paper. The idea 
of internationally protected human rights was placed on the international agenda when 
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948. The UN defines human rights as rights inherent to all human beings, 
                                                
2 Bruce E. Moon. “The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State.” International Studies 
Quarterly. Vol. 27. No. 3 (September 1983). Pp. 315-340. 
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whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, 
language, or any other status.3 We are all entitled to our human rights without 
discrimination. The notion of human rights was expanded in 1976 when the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were enacted. The ICCPR commits its 
parties to respect an individual’s right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, 
freedom of assembly and rights to due process and a fair trial. The ICESCR commits its 
parties to work toward the granting of labor rights, the right to education and the right to 
an adequate standard of living. 
 Hawkins defines human rights pressures as “nonviolent activities carried out by 
transnational networks and states with the primary purpose of improving individual rights 
by creating economic and political costs for a repressive government.”4 States pressure 
other states to change their human rights practices through diplomatic channels either 
bilaterally or multilaterally. Human rights pressure groups are networks of NGOs that are 
part of the human rights movement, and work together with regional intergovernmental 
organizations and private foundations on behalf of human rights. International 
organizations develop formal procedures to discuss and investigate human rights 
situations in member states, and NGOs make states’ repressive practices more visible and 
salient, thus forcing states that otherwise would remain silent to respond. 
 
  
                                                
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations 1948 
4 Darren G. Hawkins. International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 20. 
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Literature Review 
 Research about human rights has been focused on explaining the emergence of 
international regimes and the application of human rights pressure on states. Scholars 
have been particularly interested in the formation of norms. According to this perspective, 
the impact human rights can have depends on the strength of international norms. Martha 
Finnemore, for example, adopts such an approach to show how states have intervened 
with growing historical frequency to protect human rights abroad.5 She argues that the 
growing willingness of states to use force on behalf of human rights reflects rising 
acceptance of international norms of humanitarian intervention. Jack Donnelly goes 
beyond the concept of acceptance of international norms and argues that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights has shaped society in the image of the rights that it 
enumerates. “Just as individuals ‘nature’ or ‘character’ arises from the interaction of 
natural endowment, social and environmental influences, and individual action, human 
beings create their ‘essential’ nature through social action on themselves. Human rights 
provide both a substantive model and a set of practices to realize this work of self-
creation.”6 These arguments are liberal in nature, but have been reinterpreted by 
constructivism, which considers norms to be the product of socialization. In international 
relations theory, constructivists understand the world as coming into being through a 
process of interaction between agents (individuals, states, non-state actors) and the 
structures of their broader environment. In terms of human rights, constructivists trace 
                                                
5 Martha Finnemore. The Purpose of intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of 
Force (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
6 Jack Donnelly. Universal Human Rights in Theory and in Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2013). p. 15. 
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state interest to a set of principled ideas and practices, such as the international normative 
context and transnational networks. This approach highlights the role of socialization in 
driving the effects of international human rights pressure on state actions. 
 One of the most influential and groundbreaking works to emerge in this area of 
literature in the past few years is Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink’s work, entitled The Power of 
Human Rights: Institutional Norms and Domestic Change. In this seminal work the 
authors lay out a theoretical framework for norm socialization, a process whereby human 
rights norms become internalized, “so that external pressure is no longer needed to ensure 
compliance.”7 The spiral model for globalization of human rights norms has explanatory 
power and value. Not only can it explain much of what we observe in terms of the respect 
for human rights in the world today, it can explain various levels of violation and abuse 
of these human rights as well. The spiral model consists of five stages:  
1. State repression 
2. Denial of oppression 
3. Tactical concessions 
4. Internationalization of human rights norms  
5. Rule-consistent behavior 
In fact, nearly every country in the world can be placed into one of these five phases. 
 In contrast to constructivism, realism is a long-lived approach in international 
relations. Realists look at what the group’s interests are, and the role that power 
relationships play in reconciling clashing interests. Although realists tend to generalize 
                                                
7 Thomas Rise, Steven Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink. The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 11. 
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about human rights advocates with charges of idealism and sentimentality, such 
arguments overlook the fact that human rights fit comfortably into a realist’s world 
defined by interests and anarchy. As Cyrus Vance said in explaining the Carter 
administration’s human rights policy to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: 
“The advancement of human rights is more than an ideal. It, too, is an interest. It realizes 
peaceful gains for freedom and also steps toward stability abroad, and greater security for 
America.”8 When human rights abuses could degrade the legitimacy of a partnership, 
rupture the stability of a country, or threaten political processes where a country has 
critical interests at stake, it is in that country’s interest to at least consider how it might 
deal with the issue of human rights in word and deed.  
Some claim that compliance will be greatest when international pressure is 
applied by a hegemonic state and the target state is weak internationally.9  Realists 
believe in the power of coercive sanctions, whether applied through interstate bargaining 
or issue linkages. The basic argument is that human rights compliance is most likely 
when states make their broader military or economic relations contingent on state 
performance.10 I will test this by looking at the case of the Dominican Republic. The 
combination of human rights criticism with dependence on foreign aid and investment 
can be crucial in lessening repression.  
                                                
8 Daniel R. Mahanty, Oct 9, 2013 “Realists, Too, Can Stand for Human Rights.” 
Accessed 3/2/14. http://nationalinterest.org 
9 Stephen Krasner. “Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights.” Regime Theory and 
International Relations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
10 Neta Crawford and Audie Klotz. How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). 
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While material sanctions made through foreign aid disbursements or preferential 
trade agreements are a potential source of influence on human rights-violating 
governments, a great deal of activity by the global human rights network involves public 
condemnations of a government’s human rights abuses.11 Shaming refers to when human 
rights organizations use information about human rights abuses in the popular media to 
pressure or “shame” a state regarding its human rights record. Shaming seeks to convince 
leaders that their behavior is inconsistent with an identity to which they aspire. In a study 
that examined how governments that are targeted for human rights criticism respond to 
subsequent contentious challenges, James C. Franklin found that human rights criticism 
does lead governments to reduce repression in cases where there are relatively strong 
economic ties to other countries.12 This result shows that countries with greater ties to the 
outside world, and hence more to lose, tend to be more sensitive to their international 
human rights reputation. Similarly, Murdie and Davis found that states targeted by human 
rights international non-governmental organizations often do improve their human rights 
practices.13  
 In a democracy, governments are supposed to be responsive to the public. That is 
to say, the opinions of people living within a democratic state are expected to be reflected 
in government policy. The press is a major source of the public’s information on human 
rights conditions and, therefore, a major force in shaping public opinion on the topic. In a 
                                                
11 James Franklin. “Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political 
Repression in Latin America,” International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008): pp. 187-211. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Amanda Murdie and David Davis. “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to 
Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs,” International Studies Quarterly 56 (2010): 
pp. 1-16. 
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study that examined if human rights international organizations had an impact on public 
opinion, Davies et al found that human rights organizations (HROs) provide information 
to citizens in repressive regimes about their government’s human rights practices.14 This 
study suggests that HROs impact domestic public opinion regarding a state’s respect for 
human rights.  
 On the other hand, in a study that analyzed public support for international human 
rights institutions, Min Zhou found that public support for global institutionalization of 
human rights is not universal and may be related to broader social context.15 Zhou notes 
that people with certain social, economic, and demographic characteristics are more 
likely to show support for international human rights institutions. For instance, in China 
the level of support decreases as the level of education attained rises. The declining level 
of support could be related to the notion of western proprietorship of human rights. This 
notion puts the global movement at risk because it may render obsolete the developing 
global culture of human rights. Developing countries and non-liberal states often criticize 
human rights advocates as invasive of sovereignty, the result of imbalances of power.   
 In arguments about human rights there are two well-known claims that dominate 
the discussion. First, there are those who argue that human rights are universal, and then 
there are those who claim cultural relativism in human rights. Proponents of universality 
claim that human rights are universal and there should be no exceptions in light of 
                                                
14 David Davis, Amanda Murdie and Coty Garnett Steinmetz. “ ‘Makers and Shapers’: 
Human Rights INGOs and Public Opinion,” Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 34, No. 1 
(2013): pp. 199-224. 
15 Min Zhou “Public Support for International Human Rights Institutions: A Cross-
National and Multilevel Analysis” Sociological Forum Vol. 28, No. 3 (2013): pp. 525-
548. 
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cultural or historical differences. For relativists, moral values, and thus conceptions about 
human rights are determined by history, culture and economics. In discussing the 
argument that moral values are historically or culturally specific rather than universal, 
Donnelly says that there are “three worlds” of human rights. The “Western” approach 
emphasizes civil and political rights and the right to private property. The “socialist” 
approach emphasizes economic and social rights. The “third world” approach emphasizes 
self-determination and economic development.16   
 Sonia Cardenas, in explaining human rights reform and compliance, suggests that 
national security threats, pro-violation constituencies, and domestic rules of exception or 
exclusion are important factors in mediating the influence of international human rights 
pressure on state behavior. 17 According to Cardenas, a state’s violation of international 
norms can depend on the support of pro-violation constituencies who can reside inside or 
outside the state apparatus. The author argues that international and domestic human 
rights pressures can have both direct and indirect effects. On the one hand, human rights 
pressures can lead directly to human rights commitments. This is because human rights 
pressure alters a state’s interest in appearing compliant, regardless of whether it actually 
violates international norms. Consequently, states will respond to human rights pressure 
by ratifying international agreements, acting with leniency in specific cases, providing 
access to international monitors, implementing international norms domestically, or even 
occasionally holding abusers accountable. On the other hand, as long as certain 
                                                
16 Jack Donnelly. International Human Rights (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998) p. 
35. 
17 Sonia Cardenas. Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human 
Rights Pressure (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 25. 
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conditions exist- national threats, pro-violation constituencies, and rules of exception- 
states will continue to violate international norms even in the face of international and 
domestic human rights pressures. 
 Much of the literature, therefore, suggests a relationship between the domestic 
environment and the success of international pressures. In the rest of the thesis, I examine 
two cases to see if the relationship holds.  
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Chapter 3 
Case Study: The Dominican Republic  
 The Dominican Republic, because of its small size and its relatively minor 
position in the order of international power, presents a good case to study in terms of its 
vulnerability to human rights international pressures. The Dominican Republic has often 
depended on foreign investment for capital, and as a country that has been occupied by 
the U.S. twice, it is a nation not totally in complete control of its destiny. Therefore I ask: 
is there a particular issue on which the Dominican Republic has been widely perceived as 
violating human rights? If so, has international pressure been brought to bear and has it 
been successful? Finally, if not, why not? Is it a matter of public opinion, or culture?  
A Major Human Rights Issue 
In order to understand the human rights issue, I have chosen the Dominican 
Republic’s decision in 2013 to denationalize Haitian residents. Before we get to the 
details of the case, some background on the subject is necessary. The Dominican 
Republic is situated in the Caribbean in the chain of islands called the Greater Antilles. 
Of more geographic significance is the fact that the Dominican Republic is in a rather 
unique position in that it shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti. Christopher 
Columbus landed on the north-coast of present day Haiti on Christmas day, 1492. 
Thinking that they had reached the far east, Columbus’ party erected a makeshift fort and 
began the process of establishing a Spanish presence in the New World. Santo Domingo 
became the first permanent Spanish settlement in the Americas. The failure or 
unwillingness of the Spanish to control the attacks by the French and English prompted 
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Spain to cede the western third of the island to France under the terms of the Treaty of 
Ryswick in 1697. The French- controlled western third of the island developed quickly 
into what many considered to be the richest colony in the world at that time. Relying 
upon over 500,000 slaves imported from Africa, the French led the world in the 
exportation of sugar, coffee, cocoa and other agricultural commodities.1  
In 1795, Spain ceded the eastern part of the island to France, as the war in Europe 
with Spain gave the French the opportunity to take over the rest of the island. Following a 
slave revolt led by Jean Jacques Dessalines, the Haitian rebels defeated the French army 
and declared Haiti independent in 1804-the first independent republic in the western 
hemisphere with a majority population of African descent. All Haitians regardless of skin 
color were declared noir/e under the Constitution of 1805. In 1822, the Haitian President 
Jean-Pierre Boyer invaded and occupied the eastern part of the island (present day 
Dominican Republic). The atrocities committed by the Haitian army formed an important 
historical basis for popular anti-Haitian sentiment in the Dominican Republic. The period 
from 1822 to 1844 is remembered in Dominican history, to this day, as “the Haitian 
domination,” a parenthesis in the development of native institutions during which alien 
laws based on unfamiliar principles turned social and political life upside down.2 
The Haitian occupation lasted from 1822 to 1844. Despite emancipation of the 
slaves, Dominican politics remained restricted to a small, mainly white elite. In 1844, this 
elite declared independence from Haiti. After independence the two countries developed 
important economic and political differences, one of the main ones being the political 
                                                
1 Emilio Cordero Michel. La Revolucion Haitiana y Santo Domingo (Santo Domingo: 
Editora Nacional, 1968). 
2 Ibid., pp. 25-30.  
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instability that has affected Haiti throughout the 20th century, although the Dominican 
Republic’s stability has rested on authoritarianism. A study conducted to assess the 
growth divergence of the Dominican Republic and Haiti concluded that while both 
countries share similarities in terms of geography and historical institutions, policy 
decisions since 1960 have played a central role in the growth divergence between Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic, in particular economic policies.3 A comparison of socio-
economic indices illustrates quite substantial differences. 
Table 3.1 Comparative Indices Dominican Republic and Haiti, 2012 
 
 
Source: World Bank country data, 2014 (http://data.worldbank.org) 
Two nations with vastly different heritages occupying one island is certainly an 
oddity, but the geographic uniqueness of Hispaniola is more than just the fact that two 
countries share the same parcel of land. Over the years, the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti have not been good neighbors, and in fact have been unwilling to gloss over their 
racial, economic, political and cultural differences, choosing instead to avoid contact and 
to keep age-old grudges at center stage. According to Kryzanek and Wiarda, the long 
                                                
3 Laura Jaramillo and Cemile Sancak. “Why Has the Grass Been Greener on One Side of 
Hispaniola? A Comparative Growth Analysis of the Dominican Republic and Haiti,” IMF 
staff papers, 2009 Vol. 56, No. 2. 
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period of Haitian domination of the Dominican Republic during the 19th century, the 
exodus of illegal Haitian immigrants into Dominican territory, and the constant fear of 
excessive “darkening” and “Africanizing” of Dominican society by the Haitians has 
created a definite anti-Haitian climate in the Dominican Republic.4 Anti-Haitianism 
combines a legacy of racist Spanish colonial mentality, nineteenth century racial theories, 
and twentieth century cultural racism into a web of anti-Haitian attitudes, stereotypes and 
historical distortions.5  
In describing anti-Haitianism, Teresita Martinez-Vergne contends that a key 
element of anti-Haitianism is the accusation of racial exclusivism, of isolation and anti-
Europeanism. According to her, in this respect, Dominicans would always point to 
Haiti’s birth as the result of a race war in which, according to the common wisdom, the 
savage destroyed the civilized. For this reason, blacks and mulattoes in Haiti hated each 
other and continued to fight, condemning the country to material poverty. Dominicans, 
according to their own account, welcomed racial mixture and did not obsess about it, 
while Haitians prohibited confraternization. Because of the Dominican Republic’s 
“cosmopolitanism,” Haiti would always resent its eastern neighbor and try to neutralize 
it.6  
                                                
4 Michael J. Kryzanek and Howard J. Wiarda. “The Politics of External Influence in the 
Dominican Republic,” (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988). 
5 Daly Guilamo. “Dominican Funnies, Not So Funny: The Representation of Haitians in 
Dominican Newspaper Comic Strips, After the 2010 Earthquake.” Journal of Pan 
African Studies, Vol.5, No. 9, March 2013. pp. 63-82. 
6 Teresita Martinez-Vergne. “Race in the Formation of Nationality.” Nation & Citizen in 
the Dominican Republic, 1880-1916 (Chapel Hill, N.C: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2005), p. 95. 
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Haitians began to arrive in Dominican cane fields late in the first decade of the 
twentieth century and were actively recruited as workers only after the U.S occupation of 
the island in 1916.7 The development of the sugar cane industry after World War I and 
the use of Haitian labor in this sector shaped the migration patterns of Haitians to the 
Dominican Republic. The destruction of the European beet-sugar industry created the 
opportunity for the Dominican Republic to become a major sugar producer. In order to 
satisfy the demand for labor, the United States initiated the practice of recruiting Haitians 
to work on Dominican sugar plantations. Reliance on Haitian labor in the sugar industry 
continued after the United States withdrew from the country in 1924, and Haitians 
became an exploited, yet stable supply of workers.8  
During the occupation a national constabulary was created to maintain order after 
the marines left. It was from this marine trained National Guard that the Dominican 
Republic would see the rise of their next leader, Rafael L. Trujillo, who established one 
of the most brutal dictatorships in Latin America. In a sense Trujillo’s regime is a lasting 
legacy of the U.S. occupation.9  Trujillo came to power in 1931 and for thirty-one years 
maintained a strong hold on Dominican society. According to David Howard, Trujillo 
used his power from 1930 to 1961, to pursue his anti-Haitian agenda and embarked on a 
program of “dominicanization” of the country, a nationalist program aimed at redefining 
                                                
7 Teresita Martinez-Vergne. “Race in the Formation of Nationality.” Nation & Citizen in 
the Dominican Republic, 1880-1916 (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 
2005), p. 93. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Bruce J. Calder. The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic During the U.S. 
Occupation of 1916-1924, (Austin, Tx: University of Texas Press, 1984). 
 18 
Dominican identity as white.10 The most brutal example of this policy came in 1937 
when he ordered the massacre of around 18,000 Haitians and dark-skinned Dominicans 
who resided in the border area. Continued expulsions of Haitians were carried out by the 
Dominican military during the following decades, and an intense religious and 
educational campaign was pursued in the border areas.11  
With the assassination of Trujillo in 1961 a period of instability ensued that 
culminated in the April revolution of 1965 and the U.S. occupation to contain it. After the 
U.S. occupation in 1965, Trujillo’s disciple, Joaquin Balaguer became president and 
started what Howard has termed a new era of “dominicanization.”12 In 1983, Balaguer 
published La Isla al Revés, in which he outlined the demographic threat from an 
expanding Haitian population and argued that nationality can never be granted or 
exchanged, only inherited.13  Joaquin Balaguer maintained power through fraudulent 
elections for thirty years, letting go of control, only after international pressure, for two 
terms between 1978 and 1986. 
Howard points out that the politics of the 1990s was marked by the development 
of an intensely racialized political discourse, when the mayor of Santo Domingo, José 
Francisco Peña Gómez became the presidential candidate for the Dominican 
Revolutionary Party, el Partido de la Revolucion Dominicana (PRD), and leader of the 
main opposition party. Peña Gómez had suffered racial slurs during the elections in 1982 
                                                
10 David Howard. Coloring the Nation, Race and Ethnicity in the Dominican Republic, 
(United Kingdom: Signal Books Limited, 2001). 
11 Ibid., p. 157. 
12 Ibid., p. 160. 
13 Joaquin Balaguer. La Isla al Revés: Haiti y el Destino Dominicano, (Santo Domingo: 
Editora Corripio, 1993). 
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as a candidate to be mayor, but not to the extent as he did in the 1994 and 1996 
presidential campaigns.14 The attack against Peña Gómez suggested that his Haitian 
ancestry made him an improper, and potentially untrustworthy, candidate for the 
presidency. He was born to Haitian immigrants in 1937 and adopted as an infant by a 
Dominican peasant family when his parents were forced to flee back to Haiti as Trujillo 
enacted the massacre of Haitians that same year.15  
In 1994, Peña Gómez ran against Balaguer, who orchestrated one of the biggest 
election frauds in Dominican history to stop his opponent from getting to office. The 
scale of the fraud received international media coverage. International pressure led to an 
agreement between the political parties, limiting Balaguer’s term to eighteen months, 
later extended to two years after political maneuvering.16  
In 1996, Peña Gómez ran against Leonel Fernández and Jacinto Peynado. With an 
80 percent turnout on May 16, the leading vote getters were Peña Gómez, with 45.94 
percent, and Fernández with 39.94 percent. The ruling party’s candidate, Peynado, 
mustered only 14.99 percent.17 Balaguer decided not to endorse his party’s nominee and 
instead endorsed the young newcomer, Fernández. Despite being from an opposition 
party, Fernández, a mulatto, shared Balaguer’s conservative, anti-communist stance that 
made him attractive to Balaguer. Balaguer made public calls to support “a real 
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15 Ibid., p. 178. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Vito Echecarria. September 1996. “Racism, Foreign Money Dominate “clean” 
Dominican Elections.” Hispanic magazine.  Vol.9 Issue 9. 
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Dominican” candidate versus the Haitian one.18 His public rallying proved effective when 
Fernández was declared the winner of the second round of elections. International 
observers upheld the legitimacy of both rounds.19 The fear of Haitian influence, and the 
possible fusion of the island under Haitian dominance, prompted the formation of a 
patriotic front to block Peña Gómez from gaining the presidency, first through fraud and 
then through an unlikely pact between opposing parties. For the controlling elite it was 
unacceptable that a dark-skinned Dominican could become president of the country.20  
During Fernández’ presidency, first in 1996-2000, and then 2004-2012 the 
deportation of Haitian immigrants and the irregularities in the birth registration of 
Dominicans of Haitian descent caught international attention. In early 1997, the 
Dominican Republic again launched a sweeping campaign to expel undocumented 
Haitians. In two months, an estimated 25,000 suspected Haitians were expelled from the 
country.21 A massive deportation campaign in November 1999 resulted in the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights issuing precautionary measures against the 
Dominican Republic. The commission’s order called upon the Dominican authorities to 
ease the mass expulsion of foreigners, and to respect due process norms in conducting 
future deportations. It is difficult to establish an average deportation rate, but a network 
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20 David Howard. Coloring the Nation, Race and Ethnicity in the Dominican Republic, 
(United Kingdom: Signal Books Limited, 2001), p. 167. 
21 Human Rights Watch. 2002. “Illegal People:” Haitians and Dominico-Haitians in the 
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of organizations that monitors the border estimates they go over the ten thousand mark 
each year. 22 For details see the chart below.  
Table 3.2 Deportations of Haitian Immigrants from the Dominican Republic 
Source: Groupe d’Appui aux Rapatriés et Refugiés (Support group for deportees and 
refugees), 2009 Annual Report. 
 
In 2005, Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosico, two girls of Haitian descent born in the 
Dominican Republic, sued the Dominican Republic in the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. The Dominican registry office refused to issue birth certificates for the 
children even though the Dominican constitution in effect at that time recognized every 
child born in the Dominican territory as a Dominican citizen. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights filed an application with the Inter-American Court of 
                                                
22 Groupe d’Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés (GARR). 2009. Rapport Annuel Sur la 
Situation des Droits Humains des Haitiens/nes dans la Migration et a la Frontiere 
Haitiano-Dominicaine en 2008.  
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Human Rights, alleging that the Dominican government’s discriminatory policies had 
rendered Yean and Bosico stateless and forced them to live in very vulnerable 
circumstances. The Court ordered the Dominican Republic to issue the girls’ birth 
certificates and to take the necessary steps to ensure non-discrimination against children 
born in the Dominican Republic to Haitian parents. While voting in favor of the adoption 
of the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judge A.A Cançado 
Trindade submitted a separate opinion to emphasize the importance of the case because it 
was the first time in its history that the Inter-American Court ruled in the right to 
nationality under the American Convention on Human Rights. In his separate opinion 
Judge Cançado stated, “the issues of nationality cannot be considered merely from the 
perspective of the state’s discretional authority, because general principles of 
international law are involved, such as the obligation to protect.”23 
In 2010 the Dominican Republic amended its Constitution to change its statute on 
the granting of citizenship. Prior to 2010 the Dominican constitution granted citizenship 
on the basis of jus soli, or the right of being born on the land. This new amendment 
granted citizenship on the basis of, jus sanguini, or right of blood, thus granting 
Dominican citizenship to people born to Dominican nationals. With this move the 
government sought to silence the international critics that demanded Dominican 
nationality for those born in the Dominican Republic regardless of their Haitian ancestry. 
On September 23, 2013 the Dominican Republic’s Constitutional Court found 
that the provision on citizenship in the 1929 Dominican constitution, which recognizes as 
a citizen anyone born in the country, should not apply to the children of parents who were 
                                                
23 Yean and Bosico V. Dominican Republic, Inter-American Court of Human Rights No. 
130 (Sept. 8, 2005). 
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not “legal residents” at the time of their birth, on the basis that their parents were “in 
transit.” It further ruled that as a result these children, and subsequent generations born on 
Dominican soil, are excluded from the citizenship guarantee provided by the 
constitution.24 The Court’s decision effectively strips citizenship rights from the 
descendants of Haitian migrants who settled in the Dominican Republic from the start of 
the 20th century, despite the fact that the current constitution declares as Dominican 
anyone who enjoyed Dominican citizenship prior to 2010. The vast majority of these 
individuals will be left stateless. This ruling threatens a massive denationalization that 
will have a potentially devastating impact on hundreds of thousands of Dominican 
citizens. It risks rendering tens of thousands of people stateless, and excluding them from 
basic state services including access to health care and education.25 
According to legal analysts, the Court decision directly defies the 2005 judgment 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In Yean & Bosico v. Dominican Republic, 
the Inter-American Court had ruled that the migratory status of the parents can never 
constitute justification for the deprivation of nationality and that children cannot inherit 
the migratory status of their parents. At that time the court observed, “To consider that a 
person is in transit, irrespective of the classification used, the State must respect a 
reasonable temporal limit and understand that a foreigner who develops connections in a 
State cannot be equated to a person in transit.”26 In contrast, the constitutional court, in 
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direct violation of the Inter-American Court’s ruling, uses the concept of in transit to 
define the status of the immigrants and descendants of immigrants that have lived in the 
country for decades.  
Legal analysts also note that the 2013 ruling also provides a highly disturbing 
procedure for its implementation that would constitute a breach of international 
prohibitions against racial and ethnic discrimination. It proposes the identification and 
listing of all citizens of “foreign origin” from the Dominican Civil Registry and the 
creation of a second list for those who under the new criteria given by the court are 
considered to be mistakenly registered as Dominicans. The names of people listed in this 
new regime will then be administratively transferred to foreigners’ books and notified to 
the foreign ministry so that the ministry can inform the affected individuals and the 
supposed correspondent embassy. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
pointed out that these procedures ordered in the constitutional court’s ruling clearly 
violate the Dominican Republic’s obligations under well-established human rights 
principles, particularly the universal anti-discrimination norm.27 
As noted above, the UNHCR criticized the judgment, noting also that the 
Dominican Republic is a party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination (ICERD) and as such has human rights obligations to ensure 
equal protection before the law as in the granting of nationality. The UNHCR regional 
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on Persons of Haitian Descent,” (10/01/13) http://www.unhcr.org/524c0c929.html. 
Accessed 3/20.14. 
 25 
representative, Shelly Pitterman, also noted that it is a basic principle of international law 
that no one should be deprived of a nationality if that action leads to statelessness.28 
International Pressure 
My hypothesis is that states will only ignore international pressure for reasons of 
culture and strong public opinion. I will now focus on the international pressure that has 
been applied to the Dominican Republic in this case. The international community has 
been quick to express its contempt for the Court ruling. Like other organizations, the 
Caribbean Community (Caricom) has put the Dominican Republic’s accession 
application, which was in process,  on hold pending the country’s revocation of the Court 
ruling.29 In the United States, the Congressional Black Caucus issued a statement 
expressing its concern for the human rights impact of the ruling.30 Moreover, various 
human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Oxfam international, all 
expressed deep concern for the application of the Court’s decision and advocated for a 
solution for all those affected.31 This international criticism was met with responses that 
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appealed to sovereignty and nationalism. President Danilo Medina reiterated the 
country’s right to establish its citizenship laws, while at the same time he acknowledged 
that those denationalized are living a human drama.  
At the official level, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights carried 
out a country visit in December 2013 to assess the impact of the denationalization 
ordered by the Court’s decision. In terms of bilateral pressures, the President of 
Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro presided over a meeting between the Dominican President 
Danilo Medina, and Haitian President Michel Martelly in a bilateral push to get the two 
countries to discuss possible solutions for those stripped of their citizenship. Since the 
first meeting in December the talks have continued but not much progress has been 
attained. The Vice President of the United States, Joe Biden was scheduled to visit the 
Dominican Republic in March 2014, as the last stop on his trip throughout Latin 
America. During this visit Biden was expected to discuss the issue of denationalization 
with President Medina, but because of the urgency of the Crimean crisis on 2014, he cut 
his trip short and at the time of this writing his trip had not been re-scheduled.32 
An online petition created by a movement that represents the people affected by 
the Court decision, quickly spread through social media sites like Facebook and Twitter, 
gained thousands of signatures and started spreading the word about those affected by the 
                                                                                                                                            
“La Oxfam Advierte: ‘La desnacionalizacion debe ser suspendida’” 
http://www.acento.com.do/index.php/news/131985/56/La-OXFAM-advierte-La-
desnacionalizacion-debe-ser-suspendida.html. Accessed 3/28/14. 
32 “Biden trae a R. Dominicana preocupacion de EEUU por desnacionalizados” 
http://www.7dias.com.do/internacionales/2014/03/08/i159341_biden-trae-dominicana-
preocupacion-eeuu-por-desnacionalizados.html#.U2rdWeZdVQo. Accessed 5/7/14. 
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ruling.33 Social media has played an important role as a platform through which people 
can express and share ideas. Most importantly, the Arab Spring in 2011 demonstrated the 
power of social media in gathering like-minded individuals to push for democracy. In the 
case of the Dominican Republic’s Court ruling, it has also proven to be an effective 
method for civil society organizations and individuals to let the world know what is 
happening on the ground. 
 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink speak about a “boomerang effect,” in which 
activists appeal to the international community to act on domestic situations.34 In this 
case, Facebook posts, tweets and hashtags have been the tools used to bring the issue to 
the international community’s attention. One of the popular hashtags for the campaign 
against the Court’s ruling has been #DroitsHumainsRD, or human rights DR. This 
hashtag became a trend when a group of young people organized a protest at an airport in 
Montreal. The protesters set a beach-like scene in which a white woman with a bikini is 
seen tanning and her hands are covered in red paint to simulate blood. The purpose of the 
protest was to hit the Dominican Republic’s $4.5 billion dollar tourism industry, and it 
was accompanied by numerous articles published online that suggested that people 
vacation somewhere else to punish the country for its human rights violations.35 
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However, there have been no reports of decline in the country’s tourism activities as of 
mid-2014, which suggests that this kind of economic attacks have not yet been 
successful. 
In my hypothesis I consider that certain conditions are necessary for international 
human rights pressure to be effective. One of the conditions is economic and military 
dependence: dependent countries are more vulnerable to economic and military threats, 
and thus are more likely to comply with international pressures. The Dominican Republic 
has not received any economic or military threats from other countries, but given the 
international attention it has received, one assumes that the country’s economic and 
military vulnerabilities might make it comply with international pressure. For example, 
Kryzanek and Wiarda point out that the U.S. government has historically had an 
influence in the Dominican military. They argue that most of the assistance provided by 
the U.S. to the Dominican military has been in two categories- Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS), a program through which weapons and equipment are distributed, and the 
Military Assistance Program (MAP) which grants or lends defense articles, services and 
training.36 
In an article published on the magazine The Nation, Todd Miller describes the 
relationship between the specialized border security corps, called CESFRONT, or 
commonly known as the Dominican border patrol, and the American military. According 
to Miller, the Dominican Republic created its border patrol in 2006 after a group of U.S. 
experts reported that there were a “series of weaknesses that will lead to all kinds of illicit 
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activities” on the Haitian-Dominican border.37 The U.S. team recommended, “There 
should be helicopters deployed in the region and a Border Guard should be created.” 38 A 
month after their report appeared, the CESFRONT was created. Given the relationship 
between the Dominican military and the U.S. government, if the U.S. threatened to 
renegotiate the terms of the partnership, or more drastically to temporarily suspend 
training and funding, the Dominican government would be pushed to reconsider its 
position.    
In terms of economic threats, the Dominican economy is highly dependent upon 
the U.S., the destination for more than half of its exports, and remittances from the U.S. 
amount to about one-tenth of GDP, equivalent to almost half of exports and three-
quarters of tourism receipts. In addition, the country suffers from marked income 
inequality and struggles with an unemployment rate of 15% in 2013.39  If we also take 
into consideration that the country is part of the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(DR-CAFTA), and that it has historically sided with the U.S. in terms of diplomatic 
matters (to the extent of contributing troops to the war in Iraq) it is not a far-fetched 
assumption to believe that if the U.S. were to pull the strings the Dominican government 
would respond.  
The European Union is also one of the Dominican Republic’s biggest donors. In 
2013, it donated $66,180 million euros for various aid projects to the Dominican 
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government.40 Furthermore, Antonio Vargas, the Director of multilateral cooperation said 
that even though many countries have manifested their contempt for the Court ruling, the 
Dominican government has been able to convince the European governments of the need 
for the projects they are funding, and thus avert the link of aid to compliance.41 In sum, 
international pressure has not been as strong as expected, and it has not been effective so 
far. 
The Domestic Environment: Explanations for the Lack of Effectiveness of 
International Pressure 
Public Opinion 
My hypothesis is that international pressure works only when the domestic 
environment is conducive to it. Even If the international pressure has not been strong, the 
Dominican Republic could hardly adopt such a policy without domestic support. In fact, 
there has been strong nationalist sentiment in support of the Court’s decision. The elite 
has been instrumental in framing the issue as a matter of Haitian immigration instead of 
an issue of stripping of citizenship from those who had already received it. This 
disinformation or manipulation of the facts has created a divide in public opinion about 
the matter. For instance, a group of self-titled “Intellectuals in support of the Dominican 
Republic” published a letter condemning The Company of Jesus, a regional Jesuit 
organization, for their position in opposing the Court decision. In the letter, the 
“intellectuals” claim that the Court decision does not strip the citizenship of Dominicans 
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of Haitian descent, but instead gives the Dominican government the right to investigate 
the cases of those who obtained their documentation fraudulently, and that allows the 
government to stop this practice and punish the responsible individuals.42   
Another view that has been popularized in the mass media has been that the Court 
ruling does not denationalize those who have Dominican nationality, but instead the 
Court has simply ordered the implementation of a “plan de regularizacion nacional,” an 
immigration bill that would control the flow of undocumented Haitians to the Dominican 
Republic.43 Consuelo Despradel, a well-known journalist who hosts a radio and a 
television show, has used her image in the media to echo that argument and to organize 
protests against those who according to her are “damaging the country’s international 
image.”44 The constant presence of well-known public figures in the media presenting 
these kinds of arguments has played a big role in the public’s perception about the 
situation. Some polls show widespread support for the Court decision, others slight 
support, and one of the most interesting, finds that 62 percent of the population think the 
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Court ruling is not anti-Haitian.45 This finding represents the belief of many Dominicans 
that there is no such thing as discrimination in the country. 
According to Kryzanek and Wiarda, the “quiet power,” or the elite, in the 
Dominican Republic is actually an amalgam of the business, professional, and 
landowning elite that has consistently operated most effectively in the shadows of 
national politics.46 In fact, because the Dominican Republic is a small country with a vast 
web of interfamily relationships that cross economic, social, and political lines, the 
opinions of elite members on public policy issues can easily reach the National Palace or 
the various governmental bureaucracies. This group has put its power to work to back the 
government and label those opposed to the Court’s ruling as “traitors of the homeland.” 
Interestingly, the Cardinal of Santo Domingo, Nicolás de Jésus López Rodríguez, a 
regular figure in all political discussions, has also used his power to condemn those that 
are not supporting the government, a position that prompted Pope Francis to send him a 
public letter reminding him to advocate for the disenfranchised and those who live in the 
margins of society.47   
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The civil society groups that have organized to advocate against denationalization 
have united forces under ideas of respect for human rights, diversity and solidarity. One 
of the organizations leading the opposition against the Court decision is Centro Bono, a 
Jesuit organization that works closely with Haitian immigrants. The organization has 
organized protests, press conferences with legal scholars that analyze the Court decision, 
and other events in which those affected can tell their stories. One such event was called 
“abrazos solidarios”48 and its organizers invited everyone opposed to the Court decision 
to meet the affected and commit to advocate for them; they also suggested giving them a 
hug, as an expression of solidarity in the face of the hatred they are experiencing.49 Other 
organizations, like the student groups “Reconocido” and “Dominicano como tu” 
(“Recognized” and “Dominican like you”) have focused on organizing peaceful protests 
and conducting workshops for those affected to understand the implications of the Court 
ruling.50 While these groups have been able to raise awareness and gather more support, 
they have not been successful in influencing a change in the government’s 
implementation of the Court ruling. 
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Culture in the Dominican Republic: The Influence of Anti-Haitianism 
The Constitutional Court’s decision has put the Dominican Republic in the 
spotlight, and not in a good way, given that countries rarely welcome criticism from 
abroad. This situation has affected the country’s international image and it threatens its 
relations with the international community. In the context of my hypothesis, why would 
the government of the Dominican Republic not change its position even if the public 
supports it? In this section I analyze the historic and cultural background that has led the 
Dominican Republic to maintain its adamant position, in spite of the pressures to comply 
with international norms and treaties.  
As described in the beginning of this chapter, anti-Haitianism was “the nectar that 
nourished-and continues to nourish-nationalism in the Dominican Republic.”51 Martinez-
Vergne says that historians have examined the periodic outbursts of “nationalist” 
sentiment in the Dominican Republic in an attempt to grasp its roots. She expands this 
noting that one sizable group of authors explains anti-Haitianism as a function of the 
efforts of the dominant classes to remain firmly at the top of the hierarchy.52 Another 
explanation for anti-Haitianism, less directly pertinent to my study, is the development of 
world capitalism. The unequal development of both parts of the island, that is, the growth 
of Saint Domingue into a plantation economy, allowed for a more conflictive and 
eventually destructive relationship between African slaves and masters. On the other 
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hand, the Dominican Republic, which had reverted to subsistence farming and cattle 
raising, developed more harmonious race relations and, conceivably, a more egalitarian 
society and form of government.53  
According to Teresita Martinez-Vergne, Dominicans at the turn of the century 
were careful to deny that they disdained Haitians because they were black. Rather, they 
insisted, the differences that made the two peoples incompatible resided in “culture”-
language, religion, body of laws, and social practices, including voodoo and cannibalism, 
two “germs even more barbarian and solvent (of culture than race is)…which placed 
Haiti at the very bottom of civilized nations.”54 
Teresita Martinez-Vergne, continues,  noting that Haitian policy was based on the 
principle of the “indivisibility of the island” which in practice translated into attempts to 
subjugate the Dominican Republic. This principle was in direct conflict with attempts to 
affirm a Dominican nationality. As a result, once independence from Haiti was achieved, 
there emerged a “fundamental, indestructible antagonism between the two peoples.”55 
The creation of the Haitian state was based on exterminating “two races from its soil, the 
white and the mixed.”56 This principle, while perhaps justified by previous events and by 
the barrier to slavery that the Haitians wished to erect, served to alienate the Dominican 
people. While Haiti developed a policy based on “the exclusivity of a single race,” the 
black race, the Dominican Republic was supposedly guided by “cosmopolitanism, the 
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expansion of all the races on its soil, although,” the author adds, “with a preference for 
the white race.”57 
According to Michael Baud, intellectuals and politicians throughout Dominican 
history have sought to make others believe that they spoke on behalf of the people. 
Conservative nationalists repeated time and again that they were merely voicing ideas 
alive within the population.58 The author questions how seriously this everyday anti-
Haitianism should be taken, and whether it has been a constant component of popular 
culture, if in the same countryside where children scare each other with tales of Haitian 
witchcraft, adults work amicably together with Haitian workers. He concludes that such 
working relations often lead to cordial personal relations.59  
How can one explain the dichotomy between the rampant covert racism that is 
held by the elite and people in government, and the everyday relations between Haitians 
and Dominican workers? Baud explains that part of the answer is that authoritarian 
nationalism in the Dominican Republic evoked the counterbalance of a more democratic 
and flexible current of nationalist thought.60 This liberal nationalism was less powerful 
and lacked the coherence and elaboration of its authoritarian rival, but it has provided an 
ideological alternative in the Dominican political arena. Where the conservatives 
implicitly or explicitly favored a hierarchical society in which the classes were more or 
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less strictly constituted along ethnic or racial lines, the liberals tried to incorporate all 
classes and colors into one project of dominicanidad or dominicanness.  
The author contends that the other part of the answer to questions concerning the 
influence of dominant anti-Haitian ideology on popular culture can be found in the 
history of the border trade. Haitian traders traveled from market to market throughout the 
Dominican countryside with their merchandise loaded on mules.61 Professional 
merchants also made regular visits to Haiti. Beyond the control of the two states, a border 
society came into existence, which followed its own logic and possessed its own 
dynamics.62 In 2010, the market at the border reported US$143.85 millions in sales, a 
sign of the strength in the bilateral business.63  
Furthermore, Baud argues that the Dominican population seems largely to have 
ignored the strong anti-Haitian bias, which developed in intellectual and political circles 
during this period. That is not to say that there is no awareness of racial differences, but 
that it goes in a different direction.64 He notes: 
Many Dominicans accept and sometimes pride themselves on their mixed descent. They 
convert the term indio, which has been considered above all as a denial of the African 
heritage in Dominican culture, into a proof of the specific mixed character of the 
Dominican population. Few Dominicans hesitate in admitting that, in practice the 
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Dominican population is a mixed one. It is worth noting that this attitude is especially 
apparent among the poorer classes living in both rural and urban areas. This suggests that 
racial attitudes in the Dominican Republic are, at least partly, class related. In contrast to 
the situation, in for example, Europe, where racist ideas and attitudes originate among the 
poor or lower middle classes who feel threatened by immigrants, in the Dominican 
Republic they spring from the elite. 65 
Thus, in the context of the lack of opposition to the Court’s decision, the previous 
passage illustrates the complexities of defining the Dominican identity as white and/or 
black. Baud notes here that there are groups of the population that accept and take pride 
in their mixed race. But the elite’s categorization of Haitians as the ones to be feared, 
have stopped the lower classes from seeing the results of the Court ruling and thus, 
mobilizing against its implementation.  In this respect, in describing the forging of a 
national identity in the Dominican Republic, Michael Baud argues that historians and 
social scientists too often interpret ethnic and nationalist ideologies expressed by elites as 
representative of popular perception.  
Apart from the ethnic dimension, there is a nationalist dimension worth discussing 
briefly. Nationalists consider foreign powers to have conspiratorial interests in the 
Dominican Republic’s internal affairs. The nationalist debate diverts attention from 
domestic problems, including political corruption.66 Second, there is the ever-present 
concern over the increasing influence of the United States in Dominican politics and 
society. For example, the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic to Spain, Cesar 
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Medina asserts that the accusations of human rights violations against the Dominican 
Republic are part of an international campaign to tarnish the country’s international 
image. Cardinal Lopez Rodriguez concurs with this argument and adds that the NGOs 
that are working with those denationalized are a “plague” to the country and are financed 
by the American government.67 Threats to sovereignty have been a major issue in the 
Dominican Republic. The country has been occupied by foreign powers for a total of 35 
years since 1822-by Haiti between 1822 and 1844, Spain between 1861 and 1865, and 
twice by the United States, from 1916 to 1924 and 1965 to 1966. International agencies 
and foreign governments had a significant input into Dominican affairs for most of the 
twentieth century. As late as 1940, the Dominican customs administrator was an 
American nominated by the United States president, a hangover from the 1910 
American-Dominican Convention.68   
Kathryn Sikkink offers a model of state acceptance of human rights norms. In the 
first stage the state denies the legitimacy of accusations and refuses to cooperate with any 
international human rights pressures. In the second stage, the state would accept the 
legitimacy of international human rights practices and will cooperate with the ratification 
of the relevant human rights treaties, but not change domestic repressive practices. In the 
final stage, the state accepts that gross violations of human rights will no longer be an 
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issue solely within its domestic jurisdiction and provides concrete responses to 
international pressures that change domestic human rights practices.69 In this case the 
first two stages are merged: the Dominican Republic has denied external accusations 
even while it cooperates with international human rights treaties, but the Dominican 
Republic has not moved to the last stage of Sikkink’s model. The denationalization 
problem comes in the heels of international charges of Haitian “slavery” on Dominican 
sugar plantations and pressure on various Dominican governments from U.S. human 
rights organizations, such as America’s Watch, to improve the terms in which the Haitian 
question have been discussed within the country. The Haitian situation became so bad 
that in 1983 the International Labor Office (ILO), upon the request of the British –based 
Anti-Slavery Society, sent an investigative mission to the Dominican Republic to explore 
the charges of inhumane treatment and near slave-like control of the workers. Later, in 
1983, the ILO released findings that embarrassed the government, but did little to 
alleviate the plight of the Haitians.70 But foreign criticism has invoked a defensive 
attitude in the Dominican Republic, especially among the elite, which considers the 
Haitian question as a threat to Dominican national identity. It confirms the historical 
suspicion that foreign powers disregard Dominican identity and favor the unification of 
the island. In this way it has provoked a more paranoid and vehement anti-Haitianism, 
sometimes mixed with anti-imperialist rhetoric.  
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As the history of anti-Haitianism suggests, the anti-Haitian sentiment has become 
deeply rooted in the Dominican elite. Therefore, it is not surprising to see the nationalist 
reaction to the Court’s decision. International human rights pressure is not only seen as 
an intervention in domestic affairs, but also as an intrusion in the definition of Dominican 
identity. The role that the media has played in providing biased information has only 
worsened the issue, with journalists and public figures that oppose denationalization 
being labeled as “traitors” by the nationalist elite.71 Given that the majority of the 
population does not favor Haitian immigration, they accept as valid the arguments that 
justify the Court ruling as a protection against the immigration of undocumented Haitians. 
Howard says that racialized politics are likely to dominate during moments when it 
becomes politically expedient to resurrect traditional racial and national rivalries, and 
analyzing the situation in the Dominican Republic it is evident that the Court decision has 
come to do just that.72  
Even if Dominicans opposed the Court ruling, it should be noted that Dominicans 
do not in general think that they can influence politics. Dark-skinned Dominicans rarely 
identify their lack of civil and political rights with their race, and rarer still do they 
politically organize in an attempt to improve their status.73 Not only does this limit the 
possibility of any participatory oriented citizenship, but it also impedes the ability of 
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groups to monitor and prevent violations of civil and political rights within these 
communities. In a survey conducted in 1994, 49.2 percent of those interviewed believed 
that the majority of Dominicans never or almost never have a means of influencing those 
in power.74 Whether this is the case or not what is important is that Dominicans believe 
that the majority of their compatriots have limited or no means of affecting politics, 
indicating that there is a sense that the majority of citizens are incapable of asserting their 
legal rights and civic responsibilities. Other alarming results from this survey are that 
75.3 percent believes that there is no equality before the law for poor and rich people. 
According to Anthony Spanakos, this widespread lack of faith in the judiciary system and 
the police supports the claim that citizen rights are perceived as particular, rather than 
universal rights.
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Chapter 4 
Case study: China 
In the study of international human rights pressures, the case of China comes to 
the fore as a country that has been under significant pressure to reform its human rights 
practices. With regards to China, the international community has not been shy in 
denouncing abuses, and bargaining with the country to secure the protection of Chinese 
citizens that face repression. Besides the involvement of human rights organizations and 
the bilateral efforts undertaken by countries like the United States, improvements in the 
protection of human rights in China have been hard to achieve. After decades of 
involvement on the issue, one would expect greater results. What explains China’s 
resistance to human rights pressure? In this chapter, following my hypothesis, I analyze 
the roles played by culture and public opinion in affecting human rights reform. I will 
first look at the current state of human rights in China, and then I will discuss the forms 
of international pressure that the country has been exposed to. Lastly, I will analyze the 
challenges that have made compliance with human rights norms and treaties, difficult to 
accomplish. 
Human Rights Issues 
The People’s Republic of China is an authoritarian state located in East Asia. It is 
a single party state in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the principal 
authority. For millennia, China’s political system was based on hereditary monarchies, 
known as dynasties. As Angle and Svensson note, during the last years of the Qing 
dynasty (1900-1911), the early signs of rights discourse started appearing in China in 
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writings published by Chinese students who had studied in Japan. In these writings the 
students reveal conscious attempts to critically reflect on the Chinese ethical and political 
heritage in light of the new political situation in which China found itself at the turn of 
the last century.1 After World War II, the communists under Mao Zedong established an 
autocratic socialist system that imposed strict controls over everyday life and cost the 
lives of tens of millions of people. As Mao attempted to impose communism, he launched 
the “Cultural Revolution,” a movement that paralyzed China politically and significantly 
affected the country economically and socially.2  
Mao’s goal was to eradicate all threats that could restore capitalism in China. This 
movement spread violent struggles around the country; millions of people were 
persecuted and suffered a wide range of abuses including public humiliation, arbitrary 
imprisonment, torture and seizure of property.3 A large segment of the population was 
forcibly displaced, most notably urban youth were transferred to rural regions. During the 
Cultural Revolution, China became one of the most isolated states, cutting all of its ties to 
the outside world. China recalled all of its ambassadors from abroad and no direct flights 
linked Beijing to any of the major cities of Asia.4  
 With Mao’s death in 1976, China slowly started to reform internally and to 
improve its relations with the rest of the world. In 1978, with Deng Xiaoping in power 
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the CCP introduced revolutionary policies, which involved new foreign trade, investment, 
and borrowing arrangements, the training of Chinese students abroad and the importation 
of foreign ideas to demonstrate that under the guidance of the CCP the country could 
modernize.5 In the course of the 1980s its GDP doubled, and foreign trade rose from 
$38.1 billion in 1980, to $69.66 billion in 1985.6 As a result of these policies, within a 
few years many aspects of the Maoist legacy were cast aside and China began to 
participate in the international community.   
Membership in international organizations rapidly advanced. In 1980, China 
joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, it also expressed an interest 
in becoming a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) a 
multilateral agreement regulating international trade, and in 1986 it was granted observer 
status.7 In 1986, China also joined the Asian Development Bank. By 1989 Beijing had 
overtaken New Delhi in becoming the world’s largest recipient of official bilateral and 
multilateral aid, receiving almost $2.2 billion a year,8 and in 1991 it joined the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.9  This was, according to analysts, a clear 
sign of Beijing’s need for economic and social development, and also of the fast growth 
the country was undergoing. 
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China became increasingly active in international human rights work in the UN 
during the 1980s: it became a member of the UN’s Human Rights Commission in 1982, 
and in 1986 it signed the Convention against Torture, although on ratification in 1988 it 
chose to opt out of Article 28 of the provision that allowed the Committee to undertake a 
confidential inquiry into evidence of the systematic use of torture.10 Although the country 
was showing more international involvement, Angle and Svensson suggest that human 
rights remained off limits in the domestic discourse.11 In the late 1980s, however, as 
China experienced a period of political liberalization that culminated in the spring of 
1989, academics and others began to debate human rights. 
Dingxin Zhao notes that as China reformed it faced the challenge of determining 
the scope of its political and economic reforms. In April 1989, Hu Yaobang, a former 
CCP General Secretary passed away and his death triggered a series of protests in Beijing. 
Hu was a liberal reformer who was forced to resign after losing a power struggle with 
hardliners over the direction of political and economic reform.12 University students 
marched and gathered in Tiananmen Square to mourn his death, and a democracy 
movement of unprecedented scale developed, as first students and then ordinary citizens 
took to the streets.13 Millions of students called for government accountability, freedom 
of the press and freedom of speech. The peaceful protests lasted through April, and at the 
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start of the protests the government took a conciliatory stance toward the protesters, but a 
compromise was never reached. As time was passing by and the movement did not want 
to lose momentum, the students organized a hunger strike that started on May 13, and 
within two days 3,000 students were fasting in Tiananmen Square.14   
The Chinese government rapidly reacted to the hunger strike and organized a 
dialogue with the movement’s leadership to convince the students to leave Tiananmen 
Square. In just two days, May 15, the President of the former Soviet Union Mikhail 
Gorbachev was visiting China for the first time in thirty years. This official visit marked 
the ending of hostile relations between the two countries.15 The dialogue between the 
government and the student movement failed, and the students remained at Tiananmen 
Square throughout Gorbachev’s visit. As the hunger strike continued, tensions escalated 
and 300,000 military troops were deployed to the area and martial law was imposed.16 
As Rosemary Foot asserts, the Chinese government’s authorization of the use of 
deadly force on June 4th 1989 against the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 
accomplished in one stroke what unrest in Tibet, earlier student demonstrations, the 
arrests of political activists, and reports of torture had failed to achieve: international 
attention became focused on human rights violations in China.17 
After years of isolationism China’s open door policies came to reveal the human 
rights atrocities that China was capable of. China’s brutal handling of the protests 
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horrified the international community. In providing an account of the weeks and months 
after the events in Tiananmen Square, Foot explains that Western and Japanese 
governmental responses were well coordinated, supported by the evidence of abuse and 
the leadership of the U.S., European countries and Japan.18 Multilateral sanctions of both 
a symbolic and material kind were imposed on China and hurt it economically, politically, 
and in terms of its international image. This propelled China along a path that began with 
denial of human rights abuses and claims of state sovereignty and noninterference.  
Scholars note that it is likely that thousands of people were killed in the 
suppression of the democracy movement on June 4th; though no official or reliable 
figures are available, tens of thousands of people were arrested. The regime defended its 
actions by describing the movement as a “counterrevolutionary rebellion” and those 
killed and arrested as “counterrevolutionaries” and “hooligans.”19 It dismissed foreign 
criticism as interference in its internal affairs and rejected any charges of human rights 
violations. In view of its increasing incorporation into the international human rights 
regime, however, it did not dismiss the language of human rights but instead insisted that 
China itself was the true defender of human rights, that foreign human rights concern was 
bogus and insincere, and that the students had been imbued with bourgeois understanding 
of human rights that needed to be corrected and replaced by a Marxist one.20  
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Foot notes that China’s discourse on human rights during these years, put the 
emphasis on attacking its critics for interference in its domestic affairs or for slandering 
the country. In addition, however, it began to respond to the accusations against it and 
tried to protect itself as playing a constructive global role through its support of 
international human rights instruments.21 As noted above, Beijing had started to be more 
open about the problem of the use of torture in China at the time of its signature of the 
convention.  
Since the Tiananmen crisis the international community has constantly criticized 
China’s human rights records. Amnesty International’s 2013 report on China emphasized 
the Chinese authorities’ “stranglehold” on political activists, human rights defenders and 
online activists, subjecting many to harassment, intimidation, arbitrary detention and 
enforced disappearance. According to the report, people were frequently charged with 
“endangering state security,” “inciting subversion of state power” and “leaking state 
secrets,” and were sentenced to long prison terms, in many cases for posting blogs online 
or communicating information overseas that was deemed sensitive.22  
The report also points out that authorities budgeted over 701 billion Yuan 
(approximately US$112 billion) to maintain public security, an increase of over 30 billion 
from 2011.23 This increase in the budget can be associated with the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) leadership transition that took place in March 2013. As the result of this 
transition Xi Jinping holds the three most powerful positions as CCP General Secretary, 
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State President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. It seems that in 
anticipation of the leadership transition, Chinese authorities felt the need to crackdown on 
dissidents who might present some challenges to the transition.  
Similarly, the U.S. Department of State 2013 human rights report on China, 
highlights the continuation of repression and coercion, particularly against organizations 
and individuals involved in civil and political rights advocacy. For example, in May 2013 
authorities in Sichuan Province detained and beat lawyers Tang Jitian and Jiang Tianyong 
as they attempted to visit a black jail in Ziyang that reportedly holds followers of the 
banned Falun Gong movement.24 In the section on torture and degrading treatment the 
report offers a grim picture of the treatment that detainees are subjected to. Numerous 
former prisoners and detainees reported that they were beaten, force fed, tortured with 
electric batons and held in prolonged solitary confinement. The report also describes the 
conditions in penal institutions for both political prisoners and criminal offenders as harsh 
and degrading; inadequate food, overcrowding and poor sanitation were mentioned as the 
main issues.25  
Surveying both reports it becomes clear that improvements in the state of human 
rights in China has not met the expectations of the international actors involved in the 
matter. Chinese authorities have become adept at navigating accusations of human rights, 
from denying the existence of political prisoners, asserting that authorities detained 
persons not for their political or religious views but because they violated the law, to 
refusing international humanitarian organizations access to political prisoners. This 
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makes one wonder, what has been the role of the international community in pressuring 
China to reform its human rights practices? What have been the successes and failures? 
International Pressure 
 Has China been heavily pressured by the international community? Due to 
China’s isolationism during the Cultural Revolution the international community did not 
have the mechanisms to effect pressure. Also at that time the international human rights 
regime was in its early stages which limited its effectiveness. As China re-entered the 
world scene in the 1980s, and now with a more developed human right s regime, 
criticism and pressure were at an all time high. In analyzing international human rights 
pressure on China, I will focus on the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crisis because it 
was a critical event that gathered broad international attention, not only at the moment, 
but also in the following years. The repercussions have increased human rights reporting 
in the country, and the international community’s response has been unparalleled.  
Following the Tiananmen crisis, the U.S. suspended all sales of weapons and of 
exchanges between military leaders, and banned all exchanges with the Chinese 
government above the level of assistant secretary, halted the implementation of a Sino-
American agreement on nuclear cooperation that had been agreed to, and instructed its 
representatives at the World Bank and Asian Development Bank to postpone 
consideration of new loans to China.26  
Foot describes other forms of pressure: NGOs kept up the pressure. Human 
Rights Watch/Asia in an open letter called for an even tougher response, such as the 
recall of the U.S. ambassador and the revoking of China’s Most Favored Nation status, 
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which I will discuss later in this section. The U.S. Congress at the end of June 1989, 
pressured by human rights groups, Chinese students in the U. S., and large parts of the 
press, sought to broaden these sanctions, introducing a conditional element in its 
legislation that required either that the president certify, before the lifting of such 
measures, that China had made “progress on a program of political reform” or that he 
would waive sanctions only for reasons of “national security.” That bill passed in the 
House 418 to 0 votes. However, the president was reluctant to have his hands tied on a 
foreign policy issue and, working with the Senate, substituted a phrase that made clear 
the President could lift sanctions if it was in the “national interest,” a much broader 
authority than that offered in the House bill.27 
 Beginning in July 1991, with the arrival of an Australian human rights delegation, 
foreign delegations arrived in China prepared to take Beijing to task for its disregard of 
human rights.28 Andrew Nathan reports about high-level visitors to China: 
From 1991 onward an endless procession of important visitors made public and private 
representations on human rights, including the French prime minister, the Japanese prime 
minister, two Australian parliamentary delegations, many U.S. congressional delegations, 
a European Community (EC) delegation, the Polish foreign minister, a Canadian 
parliamentary delegation, a delegation of EC ambassadors visiting Tibet, and German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl.29 
One assessment of the economic cost to China has estimated that commitments of 
new bilateral foreign assistance declined from $3.4 billion in 1988 to $1.5 billion in 1989 
and $0.7 billion in 1990 and that, on the basis of a 20 percent annual increase in aid 
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commitments, Tiananmen cost China some $11 billion in bilateral aid over four years.30 
From the start of the Tiananmen crisis, American officials had indicated in various ways 
their concern not to alienate or isolate a country as important as China. As Foot asserts, 
the first 18 months after this crisis marked the height of global criticism of China’s 
human rights record, but the years 1992 through 1995 gave some indication of the 
difficulties that would be faced by those who wished to move China beyond tactical 
concessions towards genuine acceptance of the validity of some of the core human rights 
norms.31 Major Western states, together with Japan, continued to reduce the bilateral 
pressure, for economic and strategic reasons, and China’s recapturing of its high 
economic growth rates from 1992 “enhanced its ability to pose policy dilemmas for those 
interested in competing in the Chinese market, as well as for weaker countries that were 
ready to benefit from China’s economic dealings with them.”32 
 Despite ongoing reports of China’s human rights transgressions, economic 
relations between the United States and China have continued to expand. In 1994 the 
GATT culminated in the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). China was 
not admitted as a founding member of the WTO because the U.S. and other European 
states requested changes in the Chinese economy before accepting it as a member. These 
conditions included tariff reductions, open markets and industrial policies.33  
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As part of the GATT many countries granted each other most-favored-nation 
status (MFN), which means the recipient country receives preferential trade treatments. 
After the Tiananmen Square crisis the U.S. made China’s MFN status contingent on 
human rights improvements. As a result of this policy China’s MFN status would be 
reviewed yearly.34 In 1994, the United States decided to end the connection between 
China’s human rights record and MFN status. This was particularly significant because of 
China’s increasing role in the international political economy.  The United States became 
China’s second largest trading partner, for both exports and imports. Muravchik, for 
example, concluded that in regards to China, the United States favored economics over 
human rights issues to the point of “coddling China.”35  
In the debate leading to the decision to end the connection between MFN status 
and human rights, some writers, including Harland and Simon, maintained that the most 
effective way to promote U.S. - China relations was through the reciprocal opening of 
markets and the freedom to conduct business in those markets.36 Following the liberalist 
tradition, these authors recommended that U.S. economic engagement with China was the 
most viable measure to promote political reform in China and to sustain U.S.- China 
bilateral relations. Increased economic relations with China would then serve as a catalyst 
for the expansion of China’s political, human rights, and economic reforms. The opening 
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of peaceful relations among countries through economic exchange was also highlighted 
in the U.S. - China policy position of Laura D’Andrea Tyson, who argued that U.S. 
revocation of China’s MFN status would impede the progress of China’s democratic 
reform.37  
As Morris explains, scholars of political and economic liberalism stressed that 
U.S. economic engagement with states would enhance the welfare of all, and would 
therefore hasten the pace of political and human rights reforms in China and elsewhere 
throughout the world.38 U.S. trade with China, for example, was considered to be the 
right thing to do because the concept of freedom of choice that comes in a free-market 
economy would pave the way for further individual political rights and freedoms. 
In analyzing the factors that led to China’s renewal of MFN status, Morris argues 
that complex interdependence influenced the U.S. shift in China policy from 1993 to 
1994. Channels of formal and informal contacts between and among multinational 
corporations, international organizations, and the world’s elite had factored into the 1994 
decision. As well, linkages that had been formed between U.S. and Chinese corporations 
would have been severed had President Clinton decided to base MFN renewal on China’s 
human rights records.39  
Additionally, Morris points out that economic and ideological solidarity in the 
Asian region had a significant effect on the U.S. decision to separate MFN and China’s 
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human rights.40 She adds that Asian countries acted as one with regard to their strong 
stance on an Asian interpretation of human rights, an interpretation which promoted the 
realist proposition of cultural relativism and which emphasized the sovereign rights of 
nations. “The unity of the Asian countries in challenging the Western interpretation of 
human rights provides evidence of the resistance to comply with international human 
rights, not only specifically from China, but more broadly, within the region”41 says 
Morris.  
External pressures have caused Beijing to respond defensively and sometimes in 
denial, but its responses have not yet transformed China into a society that upholds 
human rights. In 1999, a study of China’s compliance with the international human rights 
regime since 1989, noted that China had become more compliant, but its compliance did 
not result from internalized, learned behaviors.42 Beijing has become adept at offering 
gestures of compliance in exchange for other benefits, status and prestige among them, 
which, according to Kent the government seeks. While this had resulted in increased 
attention to human rights, Kent concluded that: 
…despite their best efforts, UN human rights bodies and the broader international human 
rights community have not succeeded in breaching the divide between China’s 
international human rights policy and its domestic human rights practice, but they are 
slowly making some inroads.43  
Today, widespread respect for fundamental human rights is still absent in China. 
The international community has not continued to exert pressure on China to improve its 
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human rights practices. Countries, international organizations and NGOs have only 
focused on naming and shaming, but no targeted policies like the ones put in place after 
Tiananmen are in effect.  According to Kent, the 1994 decision to de-link MFN status 
and human rights, combined with the May 2000 decision by the U.S. government to grant 
China permanent normal trade relations, has placed the cause of international human 
rights in the hands of both private and public international actors. These international 
actors on human rights issues include U.S. multinational corporations, their partners and 
suppliers, as well as international governmental organizations.44  
 
The Domestic Environment: Explanations for the Weak Effectiveness of 
International Pressure 
Public Opinion 
 Public opinion in China is hard to assess because of China’s isolation during the 
Cultural Revolution, and after its open door policies, China has remained an authoritarian 
society in which the Chinese regime does not subject itself to dialogue with or 
accountability toward the people. But if events like the Tiananmen crisis and the 
subsequent repression of political dissidents and Internet censorship suggest, Chinese 
society is slowly changing and standing up for its rights. In the aftermath of Tiananmen 
NGO activity increased dramatically in China. For example, Human Rights Watch 
opened an office in Hong Kong in October 1990, the destination of a number of Chinese 
dissidents. The work of NGOs has been crucial in advocating for human rights, collecting 
information and spreading the ideas of respect for human rights. But as the U.S. State 
                                                
44 Susan C. Morris. Trade and Human Rights: The Ethical Dimension in U.S.-China 
Relations (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002), p. 154. 
 58 
Department’s report highlighted, human rights NGOs face a great amount of scrutiny and 
harassment by the Chinese state, actions that significantly limit the impact of their work.  
Zhan Ning states that the concept of public opinion was introduced in China from 
the West at the end of the nineteenth century. Before then, one finds the Chinese idea of 
Yanlu, which conventionally designates the “channels through which criticism and 
suggestions can be transmitted to the authorities.”45 According to Ning, the new elites, 
who do not question the legitimacy of the government, sometimes resort to this ancient 
notion in order to transmit their criticism in an acceptable form. The notion of public 
opinion in China has a range of meanings, both because of the number of translations of 
the expression and because of the evolution of the historical context. Mao, in his own 
language, distinguished the “people’s will” (renmin de yiyuan) from opinion (yulun).46  
Going back to the literature review, in a study that analyzed public support for 
international human rights institutions, Min Zhou found that public support for global 
institutionalization of human rights is not universal and may be related to a broader social 
context.47 Zhou notes that people with certain social, economic, and demographic 
characteristics are more likely to show support for international human rights institutions. 
For instance, in China the level of support decreases as the level of education attained 
rises (see figure 4.1). The United States and China therefore, display a sharp contrast in 
the effect of education. While the higher level of education attained increases the level of 
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support in the United States, this group shows less support in China. Zhou concludes that 
the declining level of support could be related to the notion of western proprietorship of 
human rights, and that this notion puts the global movement at risk because it may render 
obsolete the developing global culture of human rights. Zhou continues that developing 
countries and non-liberal states often criticize human rights advocates as invasive of 
sovereignty, the result of imbalances of power and ethnocentrism.48  
Figure 4.1 Chinese Public Support for International Human Rights Institutions Vs. 
American’s Responses 
 
Source: Min Zhou “Public Support for International Human Rights Institutions: A Cross-
National and Multilevel Analysis” Sociological Forum Vol. 28, No. 3 (2013) p525-548. 
 The apathy of the rising middle class can be explained by a study that suggests 
that the members of that group have displayed either a lack of interest in politics, or a 
preference for political stability rather than rapid democratization, as a result of economic 
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reforms. The rising middle class has been careful not to jeopardize their economic gains, 
and have expressed some fear of grassroots democracy.49  
Public opinion in China is affected by censorship and the fact that the state still 
directly controls the largest mass media outlets, pressures other media regarding sensitive 
stories, and imposes severe measures against its critics. King et al, provide an important 
point when they argue that the purpose of the Chinese censorship program is to reduce 
the probability of collective action by clipping social ties whenever any collective 
movements are in evidence or expected.50 My view is that if there is a need for 
censorship it is because people are changing and are demanding that their rights be 
respected. This also has to do with the expansion of the Chinese middle class. Perhaps 
some of this is attributable to the work of human rights organizations, although it is hard 
to tell.  
The vastness of the population in China makes it difficult to establish effective 
internal networks of opposition that may benefit from the support offered by external 
advocates of reform. Economic growth is uneven, so what appears to be significant 
development is, in fact, limited to a small segment of the population- “China has yet to 
achieve the level of growth necessary to lift enough boats”- so popular demand for more 
extensive rights has yet to increase significantly.51  
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As discussed in this section, public opinion in China is hard to assess because it is 
a relatively new concept. In addition, state repression and censorship make it very 
difficult for people to express their opinions, much less to criticize the government and 
push for human rights. The fact that under these conditions there are many activists and 
dissidents that risk their lives to have their voices heard is an indication that things might 
be moving in the right direction. 
Chinese Culture: A Challenge to Human Rights 
In the debate about human rights, China has often responded that human rights are 
a creation of the West and that pressure to comply with human rights international norms 
are a tool of Western imperialism. The idea that all human beings, simply because they 
are human, have certain inalienable rights, was essentially foreign to Asian political 
thought. As Angle and Svensson have explained classical Confucianism, along with most 
other Chinese schools of thought, denies that the sole unit of ethical or political 
assessment is the individual. Instead, theorizing begins from relationships and roles 
within relationships, “Confucian thinkers stress reciprocal responsibilities rather than 
correlated rights and duties.”52 Therefore, the responsibilities of the individual toward 
society are emphasized over the rights of the individual. 
As a result of the international criticism, the Chinese political leadership decided 
that more research on human rights issues was needed and that its official human rights 
policy needed to be refined and strengthened.  To this end, human rights research both 
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within government organs and within academic institutions, has been encouraged and 
supported. The first and most visible result of the government’s own efforts was the 
publishing of a white paper on human rights in 1991, which was followed over the years 
by a whole range of other white papers.53  The 1991 white paper outlined the Chinese 
official position on human rights, setting the parameters for both the official and other 
more academic discussions. Rather than react in shame to criticisms, Beijing responded 
with defiance and with some consistency in its response. In a sequence of white papers 
concerning human rights, Beijing explained all that it had done to promote human rights 
and also articulated a view of human rights that has several hallmarks:  
1. Conditions were worse in China before 1949 than since. 
2. China is still a developing country and must cultivate human rights in a way that is 
consistent with Chinese culture and the specific conditions in China. 
3. Consequently, China emphasizes the right to subsistence and development as the 
foundation for other civil and political rights. 
4. Legal institutions exist in China to safeguard civil and political rights, but the rights 
of the majority should not be undermined by the claims of the minority. 
5. China does respect universal human rights, but believes that these rights must be 
determined in a cooperative manner with other states, not imposed by some states on 
others. 
                                                
53 Stephen C. Angle and Marina Svensson. The Chinese Human Rights Reader: 
Documents and Commentary 1900-2000 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001) General 
Introduction Pxxviii 
 63 
6. Western states have tried to usurp the issue of human rights to use it as a political 
lever against developing states, interfering in their internal affairs in a culturally 
hegemonic fashion. 54 
Some authors, for example, Alan Wachman have suggested that the cynicism 
Beijing has shown in the face of criticisms about China’s human rights records may stem 
from a perception that foreign critics fundamentally oppose the development of China 
and have other political motives, for example turning China into a democracy. China has 
responded in a way that is consistent with the second, “denial” phase of Risse and 
Sikkink’s spiral model.55 The Chinese government has made clear that, while it accepts 
the concept of universal human rights, it rejects the Western definition and imposition of 
those rights. In an attempt to avoid having standards imposed on it by other states, say 
Risse and Sikkink, China wraps itself in the language of universality, while arguing that:  
China cannot copy the mode of human rights development of the developed Western 
countries, nor it can copy the methods of other developing countries. China can only start 
from its own reality and explore a road with its own characteristics…China has…found a 
road to promoting and developing human rights which is in line with the country’s 
reality.56 
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 Has international pressure worked? Beijing has used “cosmetic gestures” to 
impress foreigners.57 This corresponds with Risse and Sikkink’s third stage of the spiral 
model, the stage of “tactical concessions.” At that stage, governments 
..changed their human rights practices only to gain access to the material benefits of 
foreign aid or to be able to stay in power in the face of strong domestic opposition. In fact, 
the process of human rights change almost always begins with some instrumentally or 
strategically motivated adaptation by national governments to growing domestic and 
transnational pressures.58 
Among these gestures has been the regular release of political prisoners at critical 
times. Between 1990 and 1991 in an attempt to influence the debate in the USA about 
whether to grant MFN status to China, the Chinese government released 881 individuals 
associated with the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, martial law was lifted in 
Beijing, Fang Lizhi- a noted senior activist who had taken refuge in the US embassy- was 
permitted to leave the country, Han Dongfang-a lobour activist dying in prison- was 
released and China offered the U.S. assurances that it would not prohibit individuals 
“from going abroad for political reasons.”59 
Again in 1993 China released Wei Jingsheng, a long-held prisoner, when the 
International Olympic Committee was preparing to make its decision about which city 
would host the 2000 summer Olympics. Other prisoners were released on the eve of 
President Clinton’s decision about whether to grant MFN status to China in 1993. In 
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neither case did the releases buy for China the approval it sought. Both men were actually 
arrested again. Of those released, some were jailed again.60  
One explanation of why Beijing has used tactical concessions is that external 
pressure is not applied consistently or uniformly by all states. Once a state is not under 
constant pressure, the process of reform may slow, be reversed, or stall at the concession 
stage. Risse and Sikkink write of certain “blocking factors” that impede socialization to 
international norms. Citing the case of Indonesia, Risse and Sikkink explain that the 
effectiveness of external pressures applied by transnational network 
…was limited by countervailing national norms and value structures which emphasized 
sovereignty and domestic cohesion more than human rights principles. Similar 
constraining appeals to a narrowly defined sense of cultural and territorial nationalism 
were made by Hispanic elites in Guatemala when they felt threatened by network 
influence.61 
In studying the effectiveness of shaming to promote human rights in China, Alan 
Wachman considers that since the country made the transition from totalitarianism to 
authoritarianism the regime is still relatively uneasy about preserving its legitimacy, so is 
eager to preserve domestic order and reluctant to introduce potentially destabilizing 
freedoms.62  
As Wachman suggests, at this point, Beijing has discovered that, while greater 
international involvement could bring rich rewards, it could also reduce a government’s 
ability to maintain control over both domestic and external issues. Beijing’s participation 
in human rights bodies and signature of some of the international conventions, notably 
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the one against torture, suggests a growing responsiveness to international human rights 
norms and the realization that full participation in the international community required 
adherence to certain minimal rules of behavior.63  
As I have discussed above, it seems that Beijing is prepared to sacrifice a degree 
of international prestige for the sake of sovereignty. Andrew Nathan rejects the idea that 
China is not susceptible to outside pressure on the grounds that it must preserve “face” 
after frequent infringements of its sovereignty. 64 My assumption is that China has 
behaved as a realist power, making concessions it perceived as necessary to influence 
states with which it was interacting and not making them when they were not seen as 
necessary. 
When multilateral sanctions were imposed on China in the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen crisis, the impact on China’s international relations was definitely severe, 
forcing the country to make some concessions in response to criticism of its human rights 
abuses. As Foot has pointed out, “the country was damaged economically and 
psychologically and the great power status that it craved seemed further out of reach.”65 
Beijing was forced to respond, and even though egregious human rights abuses continue 
to this day, China realized that the world is watching and that human rights violations 
will not go unpunished. Morris sustains that complex interdependence played a big role 
in the U.S.’s decision to grant MFN status to China, and I believe that condition is still 
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prevalent today.66 Economic relations between China and the rest of the world are too 
intertwined to suggest the imposition of sanctions to curtail human rights violations. 
Clearly, China benefits from this complex interdependence and engages in tactical 
concessions to appear engaged in addressing its human rights issues. 
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Conclusion 
Despite the clear policy implications and mounting consequences of international 
human rights pressure, we are only beginning to understand how such pressures affect 
state compliance. How we think about compliance and the impact of international 
pressure is essential for devising more effective human rights policies. In this thesis, I 
have set out to study the impact of international human rights pressure on state 
compliance. In investigating the impact of human rights pressure on states, I 
hypothesized that certain conditions were helpful. The first condition is the absence of a 
strong public opinion and/or cultural sentiment against what the pressuring entities are 
trying to achieve. The second condition is dependency: dependent countries are more 
vulnerable to economic and military threats, and thus are more likely to comply with 
international pressures. 
Analyzing the cases of the Dominican Republic and China, I have been able to 
show that the existence of a strong public opinion and/ or cultural sentiment against 
human rights, have negatively affected the international pressure that has been exerted 
over these states to reform their human rights practices and to comply with international 
norms and treaties. In the Dominican Republic, human rights abuses against Haitian 
immigrants have been denounced since the 1930s, more specifically after the massacre in 
1937. In the subsequent years, reports about the living conditions in the sugar cane fields, 
mass deportations and issues concerning the birth registrations of Dominicans of Haitian 
descent have prompted the visits of international human rights bodies, recommendations 
and a lot of criticism from the international community. In other words, the practice of 
naming and shaming has led the discussion of human rights violations in the Dominican 
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Republic. The absence of a concerted effort to address this issue, even as thousands of 
people risk being in the limbo of statelessness, is simply shocking, and it begs the 
question, why the international community has not exerted pressure in other ways, given 
that current strategies have failed to produce results? The only answer is a combination of 
apathy and the lack of leadership to lead the efforts to push for reform.  
Meanwhile approximately 250,000 people remain stateless. Getting the 
Dominican government to act is proving a challenging task. If the international 
community joined forces and decided to address this issue more seriously, those affected 
could be able to continue their lives normally, and integrate as full members of society 
and not as the second-class citizens they are today. The human rights situation in the 
Dominican Republic requires as an immediate action bargaining with the conservative 
elite that refuses to allow any change, and in the long run, the resources of the 
international NGOs, and bilateral aid programs, are better spent on programs that 
promote diversity, anti-discrimination and democracy in the country. Such programs may 
raise awareness about Dominicans’ racial identity and empower the poor and middle 
classes. 
In the case of China, the aftermath of Tiananmen saw an increase in reporting 
about human rights conditions, and significant amounts of pressure in the first years after 
the crisis, but the international community gradually moved away from putting enough 
pressure to effect change. Today, the horrors lived by activists, opponents of the 
government and prisoners are well known. Yet, the international community has 
restricted its actions to pointing fingers and criticizing. The U.S. and other countries have 
attempted to promote human rights through bilateral relations, and public diplomacy, but 
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these efforts have only resulted in tactical concessions, and no major changes have been 
registered. Economic ties between China and the rest of the world have now become too 
tight for countries to consider hurting their own economies to promote human rights 
abroad. This is a very disappointing realization to make given the successes the 
international human rights regime has been able to produce when the different actors get 
together and act as one. 
As my research has suggested, Chinese culture has played a big role in the 
resistance to comply with international norms. Therefore, I believe that the international 
community should find a way to reconcile international human rights values and Chinese 
culture. Chinese scholars and academics in the field of human rights should be brought to 
the discussion about human rights in China, to dispel the fears of outside imposition of 
human rights values. The other alternative is to continue monitoring the situation to 
ensure the protection of political dissidents. The international community is better off 
accepting an Asian conception of human rights, and pushing for at least basic protections, 
than alienating China completely and losing the chance to achieve change, even if it is 
gradual.  
There is very little research on the role played by mass public opinion in the field 
of human rights. However, as I have discussed in this thesis there are certain links that 
help explain people’s perceptions about human rights, and more specifically when there 
is international pressure to ensure protection of those rights involved. In the Dominican 
Republic the widespread availability of biased information affects people’s perceptions of 
current events, and at the same time it makes advocating for the rights of Dominicans of 
Haitian descent and Haitian immigrants a challenging task, mainly because of the lack of 
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popular support. On the other hand, in China, censorship and the suppression of human 
rights advocates limits the reach of human rights campaigns. Further research on this 
field, could expand our knowledge of public opinion and human rights and allow for 
better strategies to address this challenge.  
 Looking at the case of the Dominican Republic the government does not provide 
a cultural response to criticism the way China does, but close examination of public 
sentiment leads to the conclusion that historical racial biases have impeded the success of 
international pressures to reform human rights practices. As the analysis in chapter three 
suggests, the predominantly white Dominican elite has consistently enforced anti-
Haitianism throughout Dominican history, and its voice has been stronger in perpetuating 
racial biases and division between Haitians and Dominicans. Understanding the 
difference between the powerful elite and the rest of the population is crucial to see why, 
pressures to overturn the Court decision, or to avert statelessness have not been well 
received in the country. Statements that denounce interference in domestic affairs, uphold 
sovereignty and incite nationalism are indications of the denial which the country seems 
to be in, in terms of its policies against Dominicans of Haitian descent and Haitian 
immigrants. Both the Dominican Republic and China have responded similarly, which is 
consistent with the way states normally respond to international pressure (Chile and 
Argentina in the 1970s offered similar responses). After all, states don’t usually admit to 
human rights violations. 
In this thesis, I have concentrated only on some of the actors that make up the 
international human rights regime: international organizations, a few of the major NGOs, 
regional courts and bilateral action by certain states. It is a small number of actors, but it 
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has served to give some signals of the impact in this issue area, and has also helped to 
illustrate how the different components of the human rights regime can operate in accord. 
Future research on this subject could concentrate on the other side of the coin, which 
would be the incentives domestic actors have to violate human rights. Such research 
could provide valuable insight into the motivations behind the domestic resistance to 
human rights pressure.  
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